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The papers collected in this book were all first presented at a conference on Socrates held in 
Athens and Delphi in 2001, under the auspices of the European Cultural Centre of Delphi, to 
mark the 2400th anniversary of Socrates’ death. The full proceedings of that conference 
have already been published (V. Karasmanis, ed. Socrates: 2400 Years since his Death, 
Delphi, European Cultural Centre of Delphi, 2004); this volume assembles some of the most 
notable papers, by leading Socratic and Platonic scholars, in a more compact form. A few of 
the papers have been revised for this volume, though in only one case, the paper by 
Theodore Scaltsas, are the revisions extensive.  
Only one of the contributors, Gerhard Seel, confronts the ‘Socratic problem’, asking to what 
extent the ‘Socrates’ presented to us in the works of Plato and others reflects the historical 
person. For the most part, the essays focus on the figure of Socrates as he is presented in 
the writings of others. Unsurprisingly, the majority of essays deal with themes from the 
dialogues of Plato commonly called Socratic (including the Meno); but Xenophon, the later 
Plato, and authors from later antiquity are also represented.  
Like many volumes arising from conferences, this collection is somewhat lacking in focus; 
only the figure of Socrates unites the essays, which cannot be said to share an overarching 
theme or to contribute to a single debate. Nevertheless the volume contains much 
interesting and stimulating material. In what follows I will comment on a few papers which 
seemed to me to raise particularly interesting points for discussion, before giving a brief 
account of the others.  
The first two essays both focus on Xenophon’s Socrates. First, Carlo Natali examines the 
concept of dialectic as presented in the Memorabilia; he finds that dialectic, while it has as a 
prerequisite the refutation of false claims to knowledge, is itself a source of positive 
teaching; it aims both at the discovery of definitions, and at distinguishing between good 
and bad things, for which definition is a precondition. Next, Gerhard Seel compares the 
versions of Socratic intellectualism found in the Memorabilia and in Plato’s Protagoras; he 
proposes that Xenophon’s puzzling remarks on this topic can be made coherent by drawing 
a distinction between akrasia before deliberation, which Xenophon’s Socrates accepts, and 
akrasia after deliberation, which he rejects; Seel argues that the form of intellectualism here 
ascribed to Socrates is both intrinsically more plausible than that found in the Protagoras, 
and more likely to have been Socrates’ own view.  
These two papers complement each other; both reveal a Socrates in Xenophon who 
parallels Plato’s Socrates in important ways, while also having significant differences from 
him. While I would question some details of Seel’s arguments, I am convinced by him that 
Xenophon does present Socrates as holding a coherent form of intellectualism, which is 
nevertheless interestingly different from that of the Protagoras. Natali perhaps overstates 
the differences between Xenophon’s Socrates, as reconstructed by him, and Plato’s; he 
holds that the positive purpose of dialectic in Xenophon contrasts with its purely negative 
purpose in Plato; but it is now widely accepted that Socrates’ dialectic in Plato’s early 
dialogues has the aim of defending positive doctrine as well as refuting false claims to 
knowledge (though certainly in Xenophon the positive aim receives greater emphasis). 
Natali also holds that Xenophon’s explanation of the aim of dialectic as the distinguishing of 
good and bad things should not be related to Plato’s conception of dialectic, in the Phaedrus 
and Politicus (and indeed the Republic), as distinguishing things according to their natures. 
But both conceptions seem to be based on a derivation of ‘dialectic’ from the active verb 
dialegein, ‘to select’, rather than the middle dialegesthai, ‘to converse’; they may be seen as 
different ways of developing the same basic idea. Indeed, the kind of distinction which 
Xenophon’s Socrates seeks, e.g. between the just and the unjust, which is achieved by giving 
definitions of those terms, can be seen as a special case of the kind of division which Plato’s 
Socrates aims at, but with an ethical twist which is not so clearly present in Plato. In any 
case, Natali shows that Xenophon’s Socrates has an interest in refutation, though it is not 
for him the main purpose of dialectic; and that he resembles Plato’s Socrates in drawing 
premises for his arguments from his interlocutors’ own views, and in relying on an 
intellectualist position. All in all, these papers support the view that Xenophon and Plato can 
be seen as independent witnesses to Socrates, who, as one would expect from witnesses 
with different outlooks, confirm one another in some ways while differing in others.  
Lesley Brown addresses the central argument of the Crito, that Socrates agreed to keep the 
laws of Athens, and suggests that it turns to a large extent on an equivocation between two 
senses of ‘agree’: agreement to do something, which is a public act, and agreement that 
something is the case, which is a private mental state, though it may be manifested in public 
behaviour. Ostensibly the argument of the personified Laws is concerned with the first — 
Socrates agreed to keep the laws — but in fact much of what they say relates rather to the 
second — his behaviour manifested his approval of them, i.e. his agreement that they are 
good laws. Such confusion between senses of ‘agree’, she suggests, was common in 
antiquity, and especially attractive in the light of Plato’s emphasis on the inner state of the 
soul in Socratic dialectic. 
I find Brown’s argument convincing; but this paper is especially notable because it manages 
to engage directly with Socrates in a way that most of the other papers do not; it treats him 
neither as an object of purely historical interest, nor merely as a starting-point for a modern 
philosophical inquiry, but as an actual partner in debate, asking ‘Is Socrates right?’. Many 
still think he is; Brown argues that he is not, but is still able to take his arguments seriously 
as contributions to the debate. This is clearly not equally possible with all parts of ancient 
philosophy; but the fact that the issues raised in the Crito are living issues shows that 
ancient philosophy can still have a direct relevance to our concerns.  
David Charles takes up the vexed question of definition in the Socratic dialogues, arguing, 
with particular reference to the Meno, that two kinds of definition are in play; one, the 
answer to the question ‘what is x?’, which gives the essence of a kind, and another, the 
answer to the question ‘what does “x” stand for?’, which simply gives the reference of a 
general term — the requirements of this latter kind of definition can be satisfied by any 
uniquely identifying description of the kind in question. However, Charles argues, although 
Socrates asks both kinds of definitional question, he does not always effectively distinguish 
between them, and this leads him — and also Plato, in later works — into a number of 
confusions.  
This paper, which develops a theme which Charles has presented elsewhere, will certainly 
provoke much debate. However, I am unconvinced that there really are two kinds of 
definition in play in the Socratic dialogues. The question ‘what does “x” stand for?’ is one to 
which different answers are appropriate according to the context and the interests of the 
questioner; and certainly a statement of the essence of x can be an appropriate answer to 
that question; for instance, since the term ‘virtue’ stands for virtue, we can answer the 
question ‘what does “virtue” stand for?’ by saying what virtue is, i.e. by giving the essence 
of virtue, saying what it is that makes people or actions virtuous. When Socrates uses 
language which seems appropriate to the second question, he may, therefore, simply be 
asking the first question in the formal mode. Charles draws attention to the language which 
Socrates uses in the Meno in asking for a definition of shape, language which does not 
reveal any particular interest in essence; but since the definition of shape is requested in 
order to illuminate what is needed in a definition of virtue, and this question was raised in 
terms which do imply an interest in essence, Plato may think that the context makes it 
sufficiently clear that a statement of essence is what is needed.  
Charles puts a lot of weight on the definition of shape offered by Socrates as ‘the only thing 
which always accompanies colour’, pointing out that this does not seem to give the essence 
of shape, and that Socrates seems prepared to accept it alongside another definition, as 
‘limit of a solid’; a thing cannot have two essences, but there can be two ways of stating 
what a term stands for. However, it is not clear that Socrates is really committed to this 
definition; he says ‘I would be content (agapōiēn) if you defined virtue in this way’ (Meno 
75c1); but agapan is not a strong word, and Socrates may be speaking concessively; ‘if you 
offered me a definition [even] as good as this one I would be pleased’ [though such a 
definition would not be wholly satisfactory]. 
In any case, there is a kind of puzzle as to how we can know at least some uniquely 
identifying descriptions of a thing without knowing the essence of that thing. How can I 
know that shape is the only thing which always accompanies colour without knowing what 
things are shapes? And how can I know that without knowing what they have in common 
which makes them shapes, i.e. what shape is? Certainly in practice we can pick out shapes 
without having an essence-giving definition of shape to hand; but it is, I think, a real puzzle 
how this is possible. (Perhaps the answer lies in a distinction between knowing what shape 
is and being able to give an account of it — a distinction which Plato’s Socrates, however, 
would surely have rejected.) Certainly it does not seem that just any uniquely identifying 
description of shape would be enough to enable us to find examples. Charles suggests that 
Socrates’ confusion of these two kinds of definition may help to explain the notorious 
‘Socratic fallacy’, the claim that we cannot ascribe properties to a thing unless we know its 
essence. But if Socrates was already convinced of this principle for other reasons, it may 
itself explain why he sees no need to distinguish between the kinds of definition.  
In other papers, Charles H. Kahn discusses the twin themes of hedonism and the denial of 
akrasia in the Protagoras, making the interesting point that in only that dialogue does 
Plato’s Socrates actually deny akrasia, i.e. the experience of being overcome by desire for 
pleasure; while other dialogues include the view that no one knowingly desires bad things 
— in them the apparent counterexample presented by akrasia is not denied, but ignored. 
Terence Irwin examines what is often seen as the central argument of Plato’s Euthyphro, the 
argument that ‘what is loved by all the gods’ cannot be an acceptable definition of piety; he 
explores the implications of this argument for Plato’s theory of Forms (following the 
reconstruction of that theory which he has given in other works), and also discusses the 
revival of the argument in the early modern period by the Cambridge Platonists, Ralph 
Cudworth and Samuel Clarke. 
Vasilis Politis argues that aporia in the Socratic dialogues can stand, not only for a 
generalised state of perplexity, but also for specific problems and the state of puzzlement 
about them, which can play an important role in directing investigation. Vassilis Karasmanis 
discusses the concept of definition in the Meno, arguing that that dialogue is designed to 
give a systematic account of the nature of definition.  
Theodore Scaltsas identifies — what some may find surprising — a metaphysical debate in a 
Socratic dialogue, the Hippias Major, and uses this as a framework for a discussion of the 
metaphysics of plural predication, i.e. of cases where we can say ‘A and B are F’ although it 
is not true that A is F and B is F.  
C.C.W. Taylor discusses the relation between Socrates and the sophists, making an 
interesting case for the view that all the definitions of the sophist in Plato’s dialogue of that 
name — not just the ‘noble sophist’, who is often seen as a portrait of Socrates — have 
characteristics in common with Socrates. 
John M. Cooper explores the philosophy of Arcesilaus, founder of the ‘sceptical’ Academy, 
and inquires into the precise nature of his scepticism; the way in which Arcesilaus’ thought 
reflected that of Socrates is considered, but the main emphasis in the paper is on Arcesilaus 
himself. Finally, Michael Frede gives an interesting account of the different perceptions of 
Socrates found in early Christianity, with some writers treating Socrates as a hero and a 
forerunner of Christianity, others dismissing him as a pagan idolater.  
These last two papers give a glimpse of the way in which Socrates continued to have an 
impact after the time of his pupils, and of the many different ways of perceiving him which 
have arisen in the history of philosophy. It would have been good if the volume had been 
able to include other historical views of Socrates — perhaps those of other early Socratics, 
and of other philosophers from later antiquity, notably the Stoics; only the last section of 
Terence Irwin’s paper touches on the influence which the figure of Socrates has had on 
philosophy in the modern period. Nevertheless, this volume does reveal some of the many 
different ways in which Socrates can be perceived, and shows how he continues to provoke 
philosophical thought. 
 
